The importance of the Viet Cong in the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War Essay Example for Free

The importance of the Viet Cong in the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War Essay Assess the importance of the Viet Cong in the Communist victory in the Second Indochina War. The Second Indochina War, which was waged throughout 1964-75, was an undefined success for the Communist cause. Whilst this result was derived from a combination of both intrinsic and international factors, due credit must be given to the extremely vital role that the ‘Viet Cong’ successfully executed. Whilst the ‘Viet Cong’ may have resembled a dynamic and competent fighting force, the foundation of their infamous reputation was primarily based upon their use of guerilla warfare tactics. These tactics, unlike conventional warfare, involved a combination of unpredictable and even primitive military strategies which is reflected in the maxim â€Å"When the enemy advances, withdraw; when he defends, harass; when he withdraws, pursue.†[1] Such tactics enabled Communist forces of the NLF to become an elusive and deadly arch-rival. To further enhance their military capabilities, Communist forces excavated a vast network of underground tunnels which were reinforced with concrete, in an effort to survive artillery bombardment as well as air strikes sanctioned under operations ‘Barrel Roll’ as well as ‘Rolling Thunder.’ As seen in ‘Source 1’ the Viet Cong also implemented various booby trap systems using punji stakes, mines and deep pits in an effort to maim and potentially kill US and ARVN forces. These tactics were extremely successful for they not only accounted for â€Å"73% of total US casualties and 11% of combat deaths†[2] but they also denied the victims of such acts any targets to shoot at, for the VC usually deserted the area. What enhanced the success of such tactics was that when these maimed soldiers returned home, they took with them a demoralizing message of the atrocities occurring in Vietnam. The psychological victory of the TET offensive, January 1968, also highlighted the strategic importance of the Viet Cong. The battle, which lasted all of a few days, involved a major deployment of VC and other Communist forces against 36 major towns within South Vietnam. The offensive concluded with the VC symbolically siegeing the US embassy in Saigon in a deliberate ploy to both humiliate and expose the US’s inability to quell the spread of Communism. Despite the fact that the VC were crippled after the almost suicidal battle, the event represented a major turning point in the Vietnamese conflict. As a result, the following night international broadcasts were made which expressed the flawed nature of LBJ’s foreign policy. Consequently the guerrilla tactics implemented by the ‘Viet Nam Cong San’ were vital to the success of the Communist regime for they gradually wore US and ARVN forces down in a war of attrition and psychological victories. Another contributing factor to the Communist victory was their ability to engage in a ‘total war of attrition.’ This concept of ‘total war’, which was described by General Ludendorff in 1935, involves â€Å"the complete mobilization of all resources, including policy and social systems, to the winning of war.†[3] The Viet Cong fulfilled this concept for not only did they sacrifice their material possessions, but more importantly their lives. Whilst the VC were obviously devoted to the cause, unfortunately this was not a uniform policy throughout all Communist units, for many individuals had personal agendas to fulfill, often involving the black-market. The well known phrase â€Å"Soldiers by night, farmers by day†[4] epitomized the Communist people’s whole hearted commitment to the cause. This contrast in roles was a valuable tool for it ensured that the home front remained productive, whilst also enabling the Viet Cong to dissolve back into society after combat, so as to fight another day. What furthered the importance of the Viet Cong’s ‘total war’ strategy was that allied soldiers would often exterminate whole villages in retribution for fallen comrades, often killing unarmed civilians. Evidence of this can be seen in My Lai massacre of 1968, in which 450 women and children were executed for ‘harboring’ VC forces. Source 2, a quote by Robert McNamara, accurately summarizes the repercussions of such a successful Communist strategy stating, â€Å"The picture of the world’s greatest superpower killing 1,000 non-combatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission†¦ is not a pretty one.†[5] In comparison to the committed nature of the Communist forces it appears that the United States fought a limited war which was justified by Lyndon Johnson in 1965 for Vietnam was only a â€Å"little piss-ant country.† [6] Unlike the VC who were quoted to â€Å"take on tanks, if necessary, with bows and arrows†[7] the US were always too concerned over the repercussions of their actions rather than having a committed aim to quell the ongoing conflict. Throughout the conflict it is obvious that US Foreign Policy was always â€Å"fighting with one hand behind its back†[8] due to LBJ’s attempts to maintain his ‘guns and butter’ approach which involved balancing civil works as well as ‘prolonging’ the Communist conflict. The United States incapacity to end the conflict was further highlighted by their fear of provoking Soviet or Chinese involvement. On many occasions, US forces had the ability to severely cripple the Communist campaign, but yet their incompetence always seemed to get the better of them which is why they never ‘got the bloody job done.’ The ‘Viet Nam Cong San’ ability to seduce the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Vietnamese home front was a vital stepping stone to the Communist victory. As a result of the intimate contact that NLF forces had with villagers throughout the conflict, an almost unbreakable bond was formed. Unlike the Allies who attempted to indoctrinate and relocate villagers through the use of ‘strategic hamlet programs’, as well as the NVA who were renowned for the use of shock tactics, the VC successfully offered support and protection in a passive manner. Consequently the VC’s relationship with villagers was extremely valuable for it often resulted in the donation of intelligence, concealment and in some cases converted soldiers. The importance of this relationship is highlighted in the quote â€Å"By 1967 US personnel couldn’t breathe without the NLF actively knowing.†[9] In comparison, the United States public was rife with division over the Vietnamese conflict. This division in America exposed the US politician’s inability to even win the hearts and minds of its own people let alone a competing nation. An extract of Source 3, â€Å"War is not simply a conflict between armies; more and more it is a struggle between competing social systems†[10] highlights the United States need for civil unity. However the anti-war movements, highlighted by the Kent State University killings as well as the ongoing debate between the ‘doves’ and the ‘hawks’, did not permit the stable and devout home front that was required to achieve victory. The final, and in a sense the most crucial, factor highlighting the importance of the Viet Cong was their strict observance to a program of logical and decisive aims. Unlike the Americans, who it seemed only aimed to â€Å"prolong the life of a corrupt and inefficient political system†[11] the NLF, of which the VC are a member, had a clear program of ambitions. Source 4 is a reliable document which illustrates such goals, the first and foremost being to â€Å"Overthrow the camouflaged colonial regime of the American imperialists and the dictatorial power of Ngo Dinh Diem.†[12] Consequently the Viet Cong’s progressive strategies were extremely important for they not only dictated the path the conflict would take, but also when and by what means they should engage in combat. In comparison to the VC’s established goals, an American author, William Broyles Jr, stated that â€Å"There was no single goal in Vietnam; there were 2.8 million goals, one for every A merican who served there†¦ the end one being to get out of Vietnam†[13] In hindsight, the dynamic role that the Viet Cong played throughout the Vietnamese conflict was vital to the Communist victory. Whilst the Viet Cong did match the large scale fighting of the NVA, its effective use of guerrilla warfare substantially crippled both the moral and fighting capabilities of the US and ARVN. Their selfless dedication to a state of ‘total war’ and their capacity to win the hearts and minds of the people essentially laid the foundations upon which Communist forces were able to launch a successful final campaign. Finally, their unwavering devotion to the Communist cause arguably provided the defining blow to the foreign imperialist’s occupation of South Vietnam. ________________ [1] ‘The Vietnam Experience; FIGHTING FOR TIME’ [2] ‘VIETNAM; THE VALOUR AND THE SORROW’ [3] http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/ [4] ‘ATLAS OF CONFLICTS; THE VIETNAM WAR’ [5] ‘ATLAS OF CONFLICTS; THE VIETNAM WAR’ [6] ‘CONFLICT IN INDOCHINA 1954-1979’ [7] ‘Contested Spaces; CONFLICT IN INDOCHINA’ [8] ‘VIETNAM; THE VALOUR AND THE SORROW’ [9] ‘VIETNAM; THE VALOUR AND THE SORROW’ [10] ‘THE AGE OF WAR; The United States Confronts the World’ [11] ‘VIETNAM; THE VALOUR AND THE SORROW’ [12] ‘Contested Spaces; CONFLICT IN INDOCHINA’ [13] ‘ATLAS OF CONFLICTS; THE VIETNAM WAR’